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IMAGINED AND RECOLLECTED GUILT 
Abstract 
Guilt is thought to maintain social harmony by motivating reparation (Haidt, 2003; Trivers, 
1971). The present study compared two methodologies commonly used to identify the neural 
correlates of guilt. The first, imagined guilt, requires participants to read hypothetical 
scenarios and then imagine themselves as the protagonist. The second, recollected guilt, 
requires participants to reflect on times they personally experienced guilt. In the fMRI 
scanner, participants were presented with guilt/neutral memories and guilt/neutral 
hypothetical scenarios. Contrasts confirmed a priori predictions that guilt memories, relative 
to guilt scenarios, were associated with significantly greater activity in regions associated 
with affect (ACC, Caudate, Insula, OFC) and social cognition (TP, precuneus). Similarly, 
results indicated that guilt memories, relative to neutral memories, were also associated with 
greater activity in affective (ACC, amygdala, Insula, OFC) and social cognition (mPFC, TP, 
precuneus, TPJ) regions. There were no significant differences between guilt hypothetical 
scenarios and neutral hypothetical scenarios in either affective or social cognition regions. 
The importance of distinguishing between different guilt inductions inside the scanner are 
discussed.  We offer explanations of our results and discuss ideas for future research. 
 






IMAGINED AND RECOLLECTED GUILT 
Introduction 
A considerable body of research has demonstrated that guilt is elicited following a 
transgression against another individual or group and will influence subsequent moral 
decisions and moral behavior (Haidt, 2003; Trivers, 1971). Guilt can, for example, motivate 
individuals to act in a reparative (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen, 2011; Tangney & Dearing, 
2002) or generally prosocial manner (Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972). 
 The motivational component of guilt is generally considered to be part of the complex 
emotional experience that constitutes guilt (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; 
Izard, 2007). Guilt can be understood as an emotion schema (Izard, 2007), involving 
interactions of self-directed negative affect with self/other distinction, agency, counterfactual 
thinking, regret and future planning. It is this interaction of emotion with cognition that is 
believed to deliver the powerful motivation to act. 
 Findings from neuroimaging support the understanding of guilt as involving a 
complex interaction of affect and cognition (see Kédia, Berthoz, Wessa, Hilton, & Martinot, 
2008 for review). Multiple studies have shown that feelings of guilt activate affect-related 
regions including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Kédia et al., 2008; Shin et al., 2000), 
the orbital frontal cortex (OFC; Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Morey et al., 2012; Zahn et 
al., 2009), the insula (Michl et al., 2014; Shin et al., 2000; Wagner, N’Diaye, Ethofer, & 
Vuilleumier, 2011), the amygdala (Berthoz, Grezes, Armony, Passingham, & Dolan, 2006; 
Kédia et al., 2008) and the basal ganglia (Kédia et al.  2008)  
One or more of these regions have been activated during experiments involving: the 
perception of emotional stimuli, including facial expressions (e.g., amygdala, Hare, 
Tottenham, Davidson, Glover, & Casey, 2005; Hariri, Tessitore, Mattay, Fera, & Weinberger, 
2002) and speech (e.g., basal ganglia, Paulmann, Pell, & Kotz, 2008; Pell & Leonard, 2003); 
changes in, and awareness of, physiological arousal (e.g., insula, Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, 
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Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; amygdala, Gläscher & Adolphs, 2003) ; motivation, including 
updating motivational states (e.g., ACC, Wager & Feldman-Barrett, 2004) and connecting 
motivational goals with visual information (e.g., basal ganglia, Kawagoe, Takikawa, & 
Hikosaka, 1998); reinforcing behaviours (e.g., the OFC, Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; 
O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; ACC, Bush et al., 2002; Etkin, 
Egner, & Kalisch, 2011) and memory encoding (e.g., amygdala, Buchanan, 2007; Canli, 
Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000) and subsequent retrieval of  emotional events (e.g., 
OFC, amygdala, (Maratos, Dolan, Morris, Henson, & Rugg, 2001)  
Social cognition networks include the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Basile et al., 
2011; Finger, Marsh, Kamel, Mitchell, & Blair, 2006; Kédia et al., 2008; Morey et al., 2012; 
Takahashi et al., 2004), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & 
Knight, 1998), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; Finger et al., 2006; Kédia et al., 2008), the 
temporal poles (TP; Finger et al., 2006; Shin et al., 2000; Wagner, N’Diaye, Ethofer, & 
Vuilleumier, 2011), and the precuneus (Kédia et al., 2008; Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; 
Takahashi et al., 2004). Social cognition networks are broadly associated with processing 
social information, including: perception (e.g., mPFC, Harris & Fiske, 2007; TPJ, Pelphrey & 
Carter, 2008), attention (e.g., TPJ, Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009), and storage and retrieval 
(e.g., precuneus, Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; TP, Olson, McCoy, Klobusicky, & Ross, 2012). 
Social cognition networks, such as the TP (Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007), the mPFC 
(Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011; Gallagher et al., 2000) and the TPJ (Saxe, 
2010), are activated during experiments where participants imagine what others might be 
thinking or feeling or where participants generally take the perspective of another. Specific 
regions in social cognition networks activated during episodes of guilt include the mPFC 
(Basile et al., 2011; Finger et al., 2006; Kédia et al., 2008; Morey et al., 2012; Takahashi et 
al., 2004), the temporal poles (Finger et al., 2006; Shin et al., 2000; Wagner et al., 2011), the 
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precuneus (Kédia et al., 2008; Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Takahashi et al., 2004) and 
the TPJ (Finger et al., 2006; Kédia et al., 2008). 
Thus, the neuroimaging literature is often interpreted as demonstrating guilt to involve 
negative affect combined with other-directed cognitions, or other variation of the emotion 
schema described by Izard (2007). This interpretation, however, cannot be fully justified 
because the limitations of neuroimaging have so far prevented direct assessment of guilt as an 
emotion schema.  
A major limitation of neuroimaging research is the necessity for participants to remain 
stationary. Even small movements or rotations of the head render the images unusable. 
Consequently, the elaborate set-ups and manipulation tasks commonly employed by social 
psychologists to induce feelings of guilt (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Regan et al., 1972) 
are not transferable for use with neuroimaging. To accommodate the limitations of 
neuroimaging, two methods of inducing guilt within the scanner have primarily been used: 
the memory recollection task and the hypothetical scenario task. Table S1 summarizes the 
different results when using these two methods to examine the neural correlates of guilt.  
Studies involving the memory recollection task typically ask participants to recall a time that 
they transgressed against another individual. The memory recollection task is commonly used 
in behavioral experiments to induce feelings of guilt (Bastian, Jetten, & Fasoli, 2011; 
Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) but has been used much less frequently 
inside the scanner (for examples, see Shin et al., 2000; Wagner et al., 2011). Participants 
recalled personal events that induced feelings of guilt and these events were presented to the 
participants during scanning to capture the neural correlates of guilty feelings. These two 
studies demonstrated common activation in the insula and TP cortices. 
 Studies involving the hypothetical scenario task typically ask participants to imagine 
they are the main protagonist in a hypothetical scenario describing a guilt-inducing event. 
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Unlike recollection, hypothetical scenarios are not directly about the participant’s personal 
behaviour, and there is less evidence that hypothetical scenarios induce feelings of guilt. A 
central component of guilt is the awareness of one’s own responsibility for having committed 
a transgression against another person or group. When asked to consider hypothetical 
scenarios, the participant is not truly responsible for any transgression or harm. 
Consequently, the response to a hypothetical scenario is likely to involve anticipatory 
thoughts about guilt or the concept of guilt (‘guilt thoughts’) rather than a feeling of guilt 
(‘guilt feelings’), which might be expected to generate considerably different neural 
activation. Only one study of guilt using hypothetical scenarios demonstrated activation of 
the insular cortex (Michl et al., 2014) and only one activated the TP cortex (Finger et al., 
2006). Michl et al (2014) used hypothetical scenarios to elicit feelings of guilt and shame but 
noted as a limitation of their study that they could not guarantee the “success of imagination 
and generation of moral feelings” (p. 155). 
Importantly, guilt thoughts lack the painful, self-directed negative affect that is central 
to guilt feelings. This difference may also impact their motivational consequences. While 
guilt feelings predict reparative or prosocial behaviours (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen, 
2012), guilt feelings can also motivate dysfunctional behaviour including self-punishment 
(Bastian et al., 2011) and anti-social behaviours (de Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & 
Zeelenberg, 2011). The self-directed negative affect of guilt feelings may motivate negative-
state relief that conflicts with the motivation for prosocial behaviours (Miller, 2010 for a 
review). 
In contrast, guilt thoughts have been shown consistently to motivate prosocial 
behaviors. Anticipating guilt has been associated with increased charity donations (Lindsey, 
2005) and a decreased likelihood of cheating in exams (Malinowski & Smith, 1985). Other 
studies have shown that subtly making the concept of guilt accessible can promote reparative 
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and prosocial behaviours (Giner-Sorolla, 2001; Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 
2007). The cognitive reflection associated with guilt thoughts may motivate actions to 
prevent guilt in the future and thus motivate prosocial behaviours (Baumeister et al., 2007). 
It seems likely, therefore, that neuroimaging studies of guilt feelings versus guilt thoughts 
will produce different activations as suggested by the summary in table S1. To date, no study 
has directly tested for differences between guilt feelings as induced by memory recollection 
and guilt thoughts as induced by hypothetical scenarios. Instead, studies have focused on 
different components of guilt, for example: deontological versus altruistic (Basile et al., 
2011), presence versus absence of an audience (Finger et al., 2006), target of agency (Kédia 
et al.  2008), and whether the outcomes are self- or other-oriented (Morey et al.  2012).  
A direct comparison of memory recollection and hypothetical scenarios will be 
obviously more definitive than the comparison in table S1 because a direct comparison will 
eliminate confounds such as differences in sample sizes and thresholding across studies. The 
average sample size of the eight studies in Table 1 equals 15.1, but only three of the studies in 
Table 1 had a sample size greater than this. There are also considerable differences in 
methods of analysis. Seven studies employed whole brain analysis with thresholds ranging 
from p<0.05 (Finger et al., 2006; Michl et al., 2004; Morey et al., 2012; Zahn et al., 2009) to 
p<0.005 (Takahashi et al.,  2004) to p<0.001 (Wagner et al.,  2011). Two studies used small 
volume corrections with a corrected p-value threshold < 0.001 (Shin et al., 2000; Kédia et al., 
2008) and one study combined whole brain analysis (p<0.001) and small volume analysis 
(p<0.05) (Berthoz et al., 2006).  
Given these differences, it is probably not surprising that table S1 does not indicate 
any single structure as significantly active across all studies. Nevertheless, it is notable that 
the two studies that used memory recollection reported significant activity in both affect-
related and social cognition structures. This is precisely what would be predicted if guilt 
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feelings induced by memory recollection involve structures associated with affect and social 
cognition. Of the studies that employed the hypothetical scenario, two studies support the 
hypothesis that guilt thoughts should not result in increased activity of affect-related 
structures.  
An additional issue is that studies comparing guilt with control scenarios have not 
taken care to ensure that control scenarios are equal in social content to guilt scenarios. This 
is an important confound. The times when the literature does show the activation of, in 
particular, social cognition structures, could thus merely be a function of the incidental social 
background involved in imagining someone else, not a key component of guilt as opposed to 
neutral but equally social situations. We therefore thought it was important to eliminate this 
confound by using neutral social situations as our control group to compare with guilt. 
Our study assessed the distinction between guilt thoughts and guilt feelings within the 
same design by drawing on recalled or anticipated guilt-evoking situations, using fMRI. In 
additional to the improvement of including a social thought control condition, we took care to 
ensure that anticipated guilt thoughts were not incidentally drawing on actual memories of 
guilt feelings, by having the anticipated situations be intentionally chosen as dissimilar to 
existing experiences.  
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty-five right-handed students from the University of Birmingham (mean age=25.7, 4 
males) took part in the study in exchange for £28 compensation. All participants provided 
written consent and were fully debriefed at the conclusion of the experiment. No participant 
had a history of neurological, psychiatric or other chronic clinical disorder.  
Pre-scanning Session 
Participants were asked to provide a written description of ten specific memories: five 
instances of a time that they had caused harm or distress to another person, and five instances 
of an emotionally-neutral event. Participants typed their memories directly in to a Word 
document. They were asked to use 50-70 words for each description.  
The memories were then serially presented to participants on a computer screen with 
their ten descriptions in a pseudo-random order (E-Prime). Participants rated the memories on 
a scale of how guilty each made them feel (0 not at all, 6 extremely guilty). Participants also 
rated the extent they felt that the behavior in each memory had violated a moral or social 
code (1 not at all, 5 completely broke a social or moral code).  
Participants were then presented with 28 hypothetical scenarios (see Supplemental 
Material 2; S2). The scenarios were carefully matched so that all scenarios described a social 
event involving the protagonist and at least one other. This ensured that differences in neural 
activity were not the product of differences in the social content of guilt and neutral 
hypothetical scenarios (Finger et al., 2006). Sixteen of the scenarios described a situation in 
which the self violates a moral or social value (A), and 12 described an emotionally neutral 
event (B). For example: 
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A. Getting on to a packed train, you decide to sit in the priority seats, even though they are 
supposed to be given to more needy people than you, and there are elderly people standing 
up. After a few stops, you hear a bump. An elderly lady has fallen over. You realise you 
should have given your seat to her. 
 
B. In order to get to university, you walk to your nearest bus stop. On the way, you bump in 
to a class mate who is also going to the bus stop. You have a conversation about the planned 
lessons and she tells you that she is going to town in the evening. After the bus journey, you 
both go to your lesson. 
 
These hypothetical scenarios were presented to participants one at a time in a pseudo-
random order, and participants were asked to rate the extent that the hypothetical protagonists 
described in each scenario had broken a moral or social code using the same scale they had 
used for their own memories. Participants also rated the extent that they could identify with 
the hypothetical scenario’s main protagonist on a scale (1 - not at all, 5 - completely), and 
were told that being unable to identify with the protagonist could be the result of themselves 
not having committed the same act or one similar to it. Once completed, participants were 
debriefed, compensated and informed that they would be contacted regarding their 
participation in the fMRI stage of the experiment. 
Each participant memory was matched with a hypothetical scenario according to their 
ratings of moral or social code violation. Exact matchings and ±1 matchings were considered 
acceptable. When there was more than one hypothetical scenario that matched with the 
memory, the hypothetical scenario with which the participant could least identify with was 
selected. The decision to measure the extent that participants could identify with the 
hypothetical memory is novel to the current research. While past research could have 
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benefitted from including a measure of identification, it was essential for the current study so 
as to control and minimize overlap between memories and scenarios.  
Of the 25 participants who attended the first session, 20 were invited back for the 
scanning session based on successful memory-hypothetical pairings. That is, their ratings of 
the extent that their memories violated a social or moral code matched their ratings for the 
extent that a hypothetical scenario described a violation of a social or moral code. This 
resulted in five guilt memories and five hypothetical scenarios that participants believed 
involved an act that violated a moral or social code to the same extent, and five neutral 
memories and five neutral hypothetical scenarios, which participants did not feel described an 
event in which a moral or social code had been violated. 
 
fMRI Paradigm 
In the second session, participants were placed in an fMRI scanner. The study incorporated 
an epoch-based design with participants viewing and reflecting upon their memories for 
extended periods of time (>10s). While in the scanner, memories (5 guilty, 5 neutral) and 
hypothetical scenarios (5 guilty, 5 neutral) were presented on a monitor positioned directly 
above the participant. The experiment was comprised of three runs. In a single run, 
participants would view all 20 presentations (10 memories, 10 hypotheticals) in a pseudo-
randomised order. Each presentation consisted of three stages: ‘reading’ (14s) during which 
they were asked to read what was presented to them, ‘reflecting’ (10s) during which they 
were asked to reflect on the presentation that they had just read, and then ‘control’ (10s), 
during which they were presented with a crosshair and instructed to empty their mind (see 
Figure 7). At the completion of the first two runs, participants were given a chance to get 
comfortable and relax before the next run started. Over the course of three runs, each memory 
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was presented three times, for a total of 60 presentations. The experiment terminated 
following the third run. Participants were debriefed and received £25 compensation. 
 
Figure 1 near here 
 
Data Acquisition 
Functional data was acquired using a Philips 3 T Achieva system to acquire BOLD contrast 
weighted echoplanar images (EPI) for the functional scans (repetition time TR=3000ms, echo 
time TE=2000ms, 48 sequentially acquired axial slices, 3mm thick with a 3x3mm in-plane 




Pre-processing and analysis of the data was conducted using SPM8 (Wellcome Department 
of Imaging Neuroscience, London). The pre-processing followed the same methodology 
outlined elsewhere (Derbyshire & Osborn, 2009). The first four fMRI volumes were 
discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium effects. Functional images were first corrected for 
differences in slice timing by resampling all slices with respect to the middle slice. 
Movement between scans was corrected for by spatially realigning each scan with the first, 
and these were then reoriented in to the standardized anatomical space provided by the MNI 
template. To complete the pre-processing, each image was smoothed in the X, Y and Z 
dimensions using a Gaussian filter of 8mm (FWHM). 
 
fMRI Statistical Analysis 
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Standard neuroimaging methods based upon the general linear model were used for single 
participant analysis, which provided contrasts for group analysis at the second level. A box-
car model convolved with a hemodynamic delay function was fitted to each voxel generating 
a statistical image corresponding to condition. Specifically, employing an epoch-based 
design, individual images were generated by subtracting BOLD activation of: (i) neutral 
memories from brain activation during reflection of guilt memories, (ii) neutral hypothetical 
scenarios from brain activation during reflection of guilt hypothetical scenarios, and (iii) guilt 
hypothetical scenarios from brain activation of guilt memories. Each of the subtractions was 
also reversed, subtracting BOLD activity during (iv) guilt memories from neutral memories, 
(v) guilt hypothetical scenarios from neutral hypothetical scenarios, (vi) and guilt memories 
from guilt hypothetical scenarios. These individual contrasts were then entered into a second 
level model to provide a group level significance map.  
Small-volume correction (SVC) was conducted across all contrasts for 10 predefined 
affective and social cognition regions. Specifically, a one-sample t-test was performed to 
assess group level bold activation using the contrast images generated at the individual level. 
Small volumes were predefined using the MRIcro atlas (www.mricro.com). 
The Talairach and Tournoux (1988) atlas and the Talairach Daemon software 
(http://www.talairach.org/applet.html) were used to infer from the coordinates the region of 
activity. The coordinates were adjusted to allow for differences between the MNI and 




Whole brain images were thresholded at puncorr<0.001, with an extent threshold of 23 
contiguous voxels consistent with previous studies (Berthoz, Grèzes, Armony, Passingham, 
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& Dolan, 2006; Kédia et al., 2008; Shin et al., 2000; Wagner et al., 2011). In addition, a 
series of mask images were created for each of the five affective regions (OFC, amygdala, 
insula, basal ganglia, ACC) and each of the four social cognition structures (mPFC, 
precuneus, TP, TPJ) identified apriori. The multiple comparisons problem was addressed 
through Family-Wise Error corrections for each mask separately (a small volume correction). 
fMRI activations were considered statistically significant if they exceeded a corrected 
threshold of pfwe<0.05. The coordinates of significant peak voxels and the size of the cluster 
were reported for each mask. 
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Results 
Matching Procedure 
There was no significant difference between the extent that guilt memories (M=3.47, 
SD=0.46) and guilt hypothetical scenarios (M=3.54, SD=0.42) were considered to have 
violated a moral or social code, t(19)=1.02, p=0.32. Similarly, there was no significant 
difference between the extent that neutral memories (M=0.80, SD=0.24) and neutral 
hypothetical scenarios (M=0.09, SD=0.26) were considered to have violated a moral or social 
code, t(19)=0.57, p=0.58.  
When more than one hypothetical scenario was considered to have violated a moral or 
social code to the same degree as a memory, the hypothetical scenario that participants could 
least identify with was chosen. Results showed that participants could identify with the 
neutral hypothetical scenarios (M=2.59, SD=1.79) significantly more than they could identify 
with the guilt hypothetical scenarios (M=1.01, SD=0.67), t(19)=3.76, p=0.001. 
 
Emotional Ratings 
Guilt feelings were significantly higher when participants reflected upon the guilt memories 
(M=4.31) than when reflecting on the neutral memories (M=0.13), t(18)=27.07, p<0.001. A 




The paradigm allowed for analysis of brain activity during the reading of each memory and 
hypothetical scenario, during reflection upon each memory and hypothetical scenario, and 
whilst observing the crosshair and being asked to empty their minds. Patterns of findings 
were similar for the reading and reflection periods of memories and hypothetical scenarios. 
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The current methodology most closely resembles that of Wagner et al. (2011). In line with 
their research, here we present the analyses of the 10s reflection period during which time 
participants reflected on the memory or hypothetical scenario they had just read. 
 
Guilt Memories vs. Neutral Memories 
When contrasted with neutral memories, guilt memories were associated with increased 
activity in both affective (OFC, ACC, Insula, Amygdala) and social cognition (mPFC, 
temporal poles, precuneus, TPJ) structures (see Figure 2, Table 1). Whole brain analysis 
revealed greater activation in the posterior cingulate and the inferior frontal cortices. There 
was no significant activity in the neutral memory condition when contrasted with the guilt 
memory condition. 
 
Guilt Hypothetical vs. Neutral Hypothetical 
When contrasted with the neutral hypothetical scenarios, guilt hypothetical scenarios were 
not associated with significant increased activity in any structure of the brain. This was the 
case following whole brain and regional analysis. Furthermore, there was also no significant 
activity for the reverse contrasts; neutral hypothetical scenarios were not associated with 
increased activity when contrasted with hypothetical guilt scenarios.  
 
Guilt Memories vs. Guilt Hypothetical Scenarios 
When neural activity during presentation of guilt memories was contrasted with neural 
activity during presentation of guilt hypotheticals, there was significantly more activity in 
both affective (OFC, ACC, caudate) and social cognition (mPFC, precuneus, superior 
temporal cortex) structures (Figure 3, Table 2). Additionally, other regions that were found to 
be significantly more active during the guilt memories compared to the guilt-laden 
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hypothetical scenarios were the thalamus, the posterior cingulate, the primary motor cortex, 
and the inferior parietal cortex. No regions were significantly more active during the guilt-
laden hypothetical scenarios when contrasted with the guilt memories. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 near here 
 
Tables 1 and 2 near here
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Discussion 
All participants provided personal accounts of recalled scenarios that involved neutral or 
guilt-related events (guilt memories). The experimenter generated hypothetical scenarios that 
also involved neutral or guilt-related events (guilt scenario). The guilt memories and guilt 
scenarios were successfully matched for the perceived extent to which they violated a moral 
or social code.  
fMRI data revealed significant activation of affective (OFC, ACC, insula and 
amygdala) and social cognition (mPFC, temporal poles, precuneus and TPJ) structures after 
viewing guilt memories compared to neutral memories. There were no significant differences 
when comparing guilt scenarios and neutral scenarios.  Direct comparison of activation 
following presentation of guilt memories with guilt scenarios confirmed greater activation of 
affective and social cognition structures after recalling guilt memories. These findings 
confirm the prediction that memories of personal events involving a moral violation will 
generate activity of both affect and social cognition structures. 
In contrast to guilt memories, guilt scenarios did not activate either affect or social 
cognition structures significantly. Previous studies using hypothetical guilt scenarios have 
reported activation of social cognition structures (Basile et al., 2011; Berthoz, Grezes, et al., 
2006; Finger et al., 2006; Kédia et al., 2008; Morey et al., 2012; Takahashi et al., 2004; Zahn 
et al., 2009). The absence of any significant activation in our study could be explained by the 
care we took to match both the guilt and neutral hypothetical scenarios so that each involved 
a social interaction. For example, one of our hypothetical guilt scenarios involved kicking a 
ball away from a group of children playing football while one of the neutral scenarios 
involved cutting a hedge for grandparents. Both scenarios involve social interaction and 
motor behavior and so might, therefore, activate similar brain regions. In contrast, past 
studies have offered hypothetical scenarios with varying levels of social content. For 
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example, Takahashi et al. (2004) presented participants with both solitary (“I change in to 
pajamas at night”) and social (“I betrayed my friend”) hypothetical scenarios. In the current 
study, even though the guilt scenario involves a moral violation, the participant has no 
personal involvement or responsibility and therefore additional areas associated with guilty 
feelings are not activated.  
The lack of activity in response to guilt scenarios does not support the suggestion that 
merely considering guilt-related events generates residual guilty feelings (Baumeister, 
DeWall, Vohs, & Alquist, 2010). In the current study, however, subjective feelings of guilt 
during scenarios were not recorded concurrently with imaging. It is possible that feelings of 
guilt were impacted by the guilt-scenarios but this impact was insufficient to generate 
significant neural activity. Although future studies may address this possibility by recording 
guilt feelings in response to all scenarios and directly correlating guilt feelings with neural 
activity, they would do so only under a sort of Heisenberg uncertainty paradox, as engaging 
in such a repetitive focus on guilt in self-report may increase its anticipation and accessibility 
beyond what is usual. Collecting guilt measures after the scan might have provided some 
information but the large number of scenarios led us to not attempt any post-hoc measures. 
Future studies might consider experimenting with post-hoc measures to at least provide some 
insight regarding subjective experience in the scanner.   
In contrast to the lack of activation after viewing guilt scenarios, viewing guilt 
memories resulted in activation of both affect and social cognition structures. This finding 
suggests that guilt memories successfully resulted in generating both affective responses and 
recall of the events involving other people and is consistent with the understanding of guilt as 
an emotion schema. Merely thinking about guilt when presented with a hypothetical guilt 
scenario did not generate activity in affect related regions, suggesting that guilt thoughts do 
not involve an automatic affective component (Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005). 
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Moreover, in this study, reflecting on guilt scenarios also resulted in no additional social 
cognition activation, which suggests that the guilt thoughts were not markedly different than 
thoughts about other social situations.  
Previous studies using guilt scenarios have demonstrated activation in affective or 
social cognition regions or both (see table S1). It is possible that these past studies 
inadvertently involved affect or cognitive triggers during the guilt scenarios that were 
effectively controlled in the current study. For example, in the current study, participants 
were presented with scenarios that they had previously rated very low in personal 
identification. This was to ensure that the distinction between memory and scenario was 
maintained. Ensuring that participants could not highly identify with the protagonist might 
also have avoided activating the affective and social cognition structures that were reported 
active in past studies. Indeed, it is possible that the low identification with the scenario led 
the participants to not engage strongly with the scenario and thus not generate any feelings of 
guilt at all. Low identity, however, does not mean low engagement and it is likely that the 
participants did engage with the scenarios. Participants were asked to imagine they were the 
protagonist and there is no reason to expect low identity to have prevented that imagined 
activity taking place; our participants did not report any difficulty in imagining what was 
happening and clearly were able to rate the scenarios for appropriateness, which indicates 
active engagement  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that past research generated more identity with the 
protagonists for other hypothetical scenarios that have been used (e.g., attending dinner at a 
Japanese friend’s house, not liking the food and spitting it out on a plate, Berthoz et al., 2006; 
forgetting to validate a friend’s lottery ticket who had winning number, Kedia et al., 2008; or 
simply viewing an upset face; Basile et al., 2011). Moreover, given the similarity between the 
scenarios used in the current study and previous research, it is unlikely that low engagement 
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with the scenarios in the current study fully explains the differences in activation. 
Nevertheless, future studies might include a mix of high and low identification scenarios to 
address this concern. Here we chose to restrict our study to personal memories and low 
identification scenarios to ensure that the activation during guilt hypotheticals was not due to 
overlap with personal memories and to provide maximal scan data to assess our central 
hypothesis. 
A further limitation is that it is not possible to know from the current study whether 
the guilt memories generated non-guilt related emotions such as frustration or despair that 
drove the affective activation. Similarly it is possible that the neutral scenarios also generated 
guilt related emotions that negated any activation from the guilt scenarios and/or involved a 
complexity that was not adequately controlled by the guilt scenarios. Future studies might 
address these points by including additional controls and recording additional subjective 
measures.  
Future research could also address the need highlighted by the current study for a 
rigorous quantitative meta-analysis of previous research. Several methodologies now exist 
that researchers should look to employ in order to localize neural activity during episodes of 
guilt. These methods, such as Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE), work by pooling 
together the 3D coordinates of peak voxels reported as active across multiple studies and 
compare the observed number of peaks to a null hypothesis distribution (for a review of 
neuroimaging meta-analysis techniques, see Wager, Lindquist & Kaplan, 2007). Such a meta-
analysis would make a substantial contribution towards clarifying some of the issues 
pertaining to guilt raised by the current study. 
Past imaging research has not explicitly distinguished guilt thoughts and guilt feeling. 
The results of the current study suggest researchers should be wary of drawing conclusions 
about emotions from studies based on hypothetical situations, as opposed to lived experience; 
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and should also study social emotions using neutral scenarios with equally social content, in 
order to separate incidental confounds from true neural correlates of emotion.  
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Demonstrates the functional imaging block design. Presentations lasted 14s. 
Participants then reflected on the memory/scenario for 10s before being presented with a 
crosshair during which they were asked to clear their minds. 
 
Figure 2. Results of the Guilt Memory/Neutral Memory Contrast. Effects are thresholded at 
p< 0.001, with a minimum cluster-size of 23 voxels. A. Left hemispheric activity of the TPJ 
(8). B. Right hemispheric activity of the OFC (1) and the Temporal Poles (6) C. Sagittal view 
of hemispheric activity of ACC (2), mPFC (5) and precuneus (7). D. Axial view of 
hemispheric activity of the amygdala (3) and insula (4). 
 
Figure 3. Results of the Guilt Memory/Guilt Hypothetical Contrast. Effects are thresholded 
at p<0.001, with a minimum cluster-size of 23 voxels.  A. Left hemisphere showing increased 
activity of the OFC (4) and the temporal pole (5). B. Sagittal view showing increased activity 
of ACC (1) and the precuneus (6). C. Axial view showing increased activity of the insula (2) 
and the caudate nucleus (3). 
   
